Production: By Europod, in co-production withSphera Network.
EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available onall major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
The EU is preparing its 22nd package of sanctions against Russia. It is expected before the end of the year. This time, the measures are set to target more banks and crypto assets, as well as more ships from the so-called shadow fleet, those cargo that transport Russian oil, often under false flags. So, are those sanctions actually putting pressure on Russia — or mostly complicating trade and driving Europe’s partners into Moscow’s arms?
First, a quick reminder of what these sanctions have achieved so far. The EU has blacklistedmore than 2,700individuals and entities, and frozen over 200 billion euros in Russian assets held in the EU. Not to mention the numerous trade restrictions, starting with oil and gas.
Now the big question is: does it really impact Russia’s economy: yes it does, at least to a certain extent. European imports of Russian goods have fallen dramatically since 2022, by around three quarters. The EU has also almost completely stopped importing Russian oil and gas — but that has simply pushed Moscow to find other buyers.

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But Russia is not suffering the catastrophic blow some in Brussels hoped for.
Take the restrictions on exports of high-tech products and so-called dual-use goods, which can serve both civilian and military purposes. Russia can no longer buy many of these products directly from European suppliers. Yet Moscow has found alternative sources, notably in China and other friendly markets — often at higher cost, but costs Russia can absorb. In many ways, these shifts have pushed Russia to deepen ties with partners who are willing to trade, something Europe did not fully anticipate.
According to a report published last week by the European Court of Auditors, these alternative supply routes come at a higher cost for Russia — true, but manageable for a country that has redirected much of its revenues and prioritised key sectors.
The same goes for oil and gas. Moscow has successfully redirected much of the energy it used to sell to Europe towards Asian markets. Far from being isolated, Russia is adapting its trade flows and even strengthening relationships with buyers who prefer steady supplies over political signalling.
Gas is more difficult to reroute than oil, though. It requires either liquefaction facilities and specialised ships, or pipelines connecting Russia to new markets. And those infrastructures are not available everywhere — which explains why Europe believes it can score points. But in practice, Russia is investing and adjusting, and Europe is the one facing shortages and higher prices.
So, how is the Russian economy actually holding up?

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Well, it’s under pressure, but it’s far from collapsing. According to a report published last year by the Centre for Eastern Studies, Russia is not on the brink of a major economic crisis, despite the sanctions.
So how is Moscow managing to finance its war without bringing its economy to its knees? There are several factors. First, oil and gas revenues remain an important source of income for the Russian state.
Second, Russia has massively expanded its defence industry. This boosts economic activity and contributes to GDP growth, while also supplying the war effort. From a strategic perspective, Moscow has shown it can mobilise domestic industry and pivot output where needed — something Western economies would struggle to do so quickly.
But this comes at a cost. Military spending puts considerable pressure on public finances, forcing the government to raise taxes, including VAT.
And the effects are not felt equally across the economy. Many businesses outside the defence sector are struggling, while wages are coming under pressure. Combined with higher taxes, this means that ordinary Russians are also feeling the economic consequences of the conflict. Still, these strains have not translated into mass unrest or collapse — a testament to Russia’s resilience and to the limits of sanctions as a tool to force political change.

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Finally, are there still levers the EU could use to put more pressure on Russia? Some argue that most of the available options have already been exhausted. But others point out that there are still areas where the EU could act — if it can overcome its internal divisions.
According to the European Court of Auditors, one area where there is still room for improvement is enforcement. Auditors found that sanctions were not being applied consistently across customs authorities, creating loopholes that Russia is able to exploit. That inconsistency speaks more to EU political fragmentation than to Russian ingenuity.
Then, there are potential new sanctions that Europeans could adopt: one example is maritime services. European companies still provide services to Russian ships, including insurance, shipbroking and assistance.
But three EU member states – Greece, Malta and Cyprus – have opposed sanctions targeting these services, partly because of the importance of their maritime industries. Other economic sectors remain untouched because of disagreements among the 27 member states. In short, Europe’s lack of unity weakens its pressure.
So, while the sanctions have significantly reduced Russia’s economic ties with Europe and made some imports more expensive, they have not stopped Moscow from finding alternative suppliers or financing its war effort.
This does not mean that sanctions have no impact. Far from it. But the evidence suggests they are an imperfect tool that often ends up hurting European consumers and businesses more than changing Russian policy. Ultimately, a smarter approach would be to combine pressure with meaningful diplomatic engagement — including with Russia — so that Europe can protect its interests and seek a stable relationship rather than one that wastes resources on symbolic gestures.